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A MANUFACTURER'S CONTINUING DUTY TO
IMPROVE PRODUCT
Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1965)
A Lockheed Constellation airliner, owned and operated by Linea Aero-
postal Venezuela (LAV), departed from New York on June 20, 1956, bound
for Marquetia, Venezuela, with libellant's husband on board. About two
hours after departure it crashed into the ocean, killing all passengers and
crew. In libellant's admiralty suit under the Death on the High Seas Act,'
the district court found that the inability of a propeller feathering mechanism,
manufactured by respondent to control the number two engine's overspeed,2
had caused the crash.8
The district court also found that respondent had been aware of mal-
functions in its feathering mechanisms as early as 1950 and admittedly had
known by 1954 that an alternative device was needed. Furthermore, by
January, 1956 respondent not only had developed a safety device called
Pitch Lock but also had put it in use on Douglas aircraft. The court con-
cluded that respondent was negligent in that it could and should have pro-
duced Pitch Lock for use on Lockheed Constellations prior to this accident.4
The court of appeals affirmed but, in a supplemental opinion denying re-
hearing, placed liability on three grounds: (1) defective design, (2) breach
1 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964).
2 The appellate court explained overspeed and feathering as follows:
Overspeed is a condition in which the propeller rotates at a rate greater than its
maximum capacity. Feathering refers to the operation whereby the blades of the
propeller are turned on their own axis so that they parallel the airstream in order
to limit rotation once the propeller has been turned off. If overspeed is not
brought under control either by feathering or some other way it is considered
highly dangerous because of the strong likelihood of disintegration of the engine
and its component parts ...
342 F.2d 232, 234 (3d Cir. 1965).
3 Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 219 F. Supp. 556, 566 (D. Del. 1963). The lower
court found that as the plane attempted to return to New York the #2 propeller de-
coupled, separated from the engine and slashed into a fuselage fuel tank shortly after
the pilot began dumping excess fuel in preparation for landing. The court concluded
that flames from the overheated engine ignited the dumping fuel and the ruptured belly
tank exploded, setting off the conflagration which caused the crash. Ibid.
4 Id. at 572. A motion to insert a cause of action on implied warranty had been
denied earlier. 204 F. Supp. 929, 940 (D. Del. 1962). In circumstances where the Death
on the High Seas Act is applicable, the courts are divided on the question whether, in the
absence of privity, a suit in admiralty may be maintained against the manufacturer on
implied warranty to the passenger. Billyou, Air Law 163-64 & n.13 (2d ed. 1964); 37 Tul.
L. Rev. 141 (1962).
5 judge Freedman objected in dissent to this ground of liability:
[T]he trial judge's opinion itself recognizes that airplanes and their parts are
still not perfect from all defects. The question is not whether there was a defect
in design and manufacture which caused the accident but whether such defect
existed at the time of the sale, and was one which fell below the standard of due
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of a duty to warn LAV after acquiring knowledge of prior failures, and (3)
breach of a duty to develop and make Pitch Lock available, based on the
continuing advisory relationship 6 extant between the manufacturer and the
airline before the crash.7
Liability for negligent design and failure to warn are well established
principles, but liability predicated upon a manufacturer's failure to improve
his product is a novel doctrine which may have far-reaching implications.
For this reason the present analysis is concerned with two questions: whether
an extension of negligence principles was necessary for the imposition of
liability and, if so, whether the manufacturer's duty to improve his product
has a sound basis and any discernible limitations.
A manufacturer's liability to those foreseeably endangered by his negli-
gently manufactured product dates from the landmark case, Mac Pherson v.
Buick Motor Co.8 The applicability of the Mac Pherson principle to persons
not in privity is well settled in aviation 9 and admiralty 0 law. As a general
care under the circumstances and constituted negligence. Any other view would
absorb negligence in the doctrine of absolute liability, which does not now re-
quire consideration as a preferable alternative.
342 F.2d at 243. But, since the propeller governor was delivered to LAV on July 8, 1954,
and the propeller on July 15, 1955, Brief for Libellants, p. 6, Noel is not clearly a negli-
gent sale case, for the facts do not indicate that Pitch Lock was or should have been in
service on any aircraft at that time.
6 Libellants claimed United supplied maintenance and service manuals with its
propellers which were supplemented by service bulletins when warranted. In addition
United maintained fifty field service representatives throughout the world to advise and
assist airlines. These representatives reported back difficulties encountered by airlines in
using United's propellers, and United advised the airlines how to prevent the trouble in
the future. Brief for Libellants, p. 10-11.
7 342 F.2d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 1965).
8 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). The opinion states in part:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.... If to the
element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of con-
tract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it care-
fully. . . . There must be knowledge of a danger, not merely possible, but
probable .... There must also be knowledge that in the usual course of events
the danger will be shared by others than the buyer.... We are dealing now with
the liability of the manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on the
market to be used without inspection by his customer.
Id. at 389-90, 111 N.. at 1053.
9 Carter Carburetor Corp. v. Riley, 186 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1951) (Manufacturer of
airplane carburetor) (applying Minn. law), overruled on other grounds, Coca Cola
Bottling Co. v. Hubbard, 203 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1953); King v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,
159 So. 2d 108, 1963 U.S. Av. 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Livesly v. Continental
Motors Corp., 331 Mich. 434, 49 N.W.2d 365 (1951) (manufacturer of airplane engine);
Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., 1940 U.S. Av. 71, 1 Av. Cas. 698 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
1937); Breen v. Conn, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 483, 1938 U.S. Av. 160, 1 Av. Cas. 772 (Ct. App.
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proposition then, respondent, as a manufacturer, 11 was under a duty to
exercise reasonable care commensurate with the risk of harm foreseeably
created by his product if defective-that degree of care which would be
exercised by an ordinary, prudent propeller manufacturer acting under the
conditions of respondent's business. 12 Since the risk of injury or loss of life
was high, respondent was bound to observe a correspondingly high degree of
care'3 in design, 14 construction, 15 inspection'6 and testing17 of the propeller
system. To determine if this duty has been discharged, courts have applied
general negligence principles:' 8 "a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and
the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution which
would be effective to avoid the harm."'19
I. LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT DESIGN
In negligent design cases against established manufacturers of widely
used products, the courts have been hesitant to impose liability, partly out
of reluctance to let juries of lay persons pass judgment on the work of ex-
perts and partly from the realization that a judgment against the manu-
facturer would open the door to many additional claims and require exten-
sive remodeling of a product or its removal from the market.20 But these
technical and economic considerations reflect only a few of the factors which
1938) (dictum) (principle did not apply to secondhand plane); 16 J. Air L. & Com. 240,
243 (1949). See Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 395, 398 (1965); Smith v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 18 F.R.D. 169, 171 (M.D. Pa. 1955), which cites the Restatement as the law of
Pennsylvania and Georgia.
10 Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98, 99 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd with opinion,
328 U.S. 85 (1946).
11 Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950) (applying Kansas
law); Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (2d Cir. 1919); Breen v. Conn,
supra note 9 (holding the rule applicable to both airplane and automobile manufacturers).
See Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 473, 476 (1961).
12 Northwestern Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956); Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., supra note 9, at
71-72, 1 Av. Cas. at 699; Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 473, 477 (1961).
'3 Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., supra note 9. Cf. Boeing Aircraft Co. v.
Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961) (Calif. law).
14 Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., supra note 9.
'5 Hudson v. Moonier, 94 F.2d 132 (8th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 304 U.S. 397
(1938); Monaco v. Hall-Ehlert GMC Sales, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 90, 158 N.Y.S.2d 444
(1956).
18 Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., supra note 11; Breen v. Conn, supra note 9.
17 Where testing is reasonably necessary to secure production of a safe product. Zesch
v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 353 Mo. 558, 567, 183 S.W.2d 140, 145 (1944); Annot.,
78 A.L.R.2d 473, 478 (1961). See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.4, at 1541 (1956).
18 Noel, "Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product,"
71 Yale L.J. 816, 818 (1962).
19 Ibid., quoting 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.4, at 1542 (1956). See Restatement
(Second), Torts § 291-93 (1965).
20 Noel, supra note 18, at 816.
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are weighed by the courts when considering whether a particular product
design subjected the users to an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm. For
this analysis, only the factors relevant to a determination of unreasonable-
ness are important. These are set out by Prosser as follows:
It is fundamental that the standard of conduct which is the
basis of the law of negligence is determined by balancing the risk, in
the light of the social value of the interest threatened, and the prob-
ability and extent of the harm, against the value of the interest
which the actor is seeking to protect, and the expedience of the
course pursued. 21
If in Noel these considerations were to be applied to the facts existing
at the time of the accident, the court was correct in finding defective design
an independent ground of negligence. Respondent knew its propeller system
had a long history of malfunctioning and that an aircraft with its passengers
could be destroyed by an uncontrollably spinning propeller. Thus respondent
could foresee a substantial risk of harm of grave proportions. In addition,
respondent possessed the knowledge and skill to produce a device that would
reduce the risk. Consequently, the burden of making the safety device avail-
able was far less than the probability and gravity of the injury likely to
occur.
However, according to Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp.22, the facts
relevant to a determination of negligent design are not those which existed
at the time of the accident but those which existed at the time respondent
designed its propeller system. If at that time respondent designed its prod-
uct in accordance with the best knowledge it possessed as an expert,23 its only
alternative to producing the propeller system was to go out of business. This
being the case, respondent should have had the benefit of "the state of the
art defense,"'24 which makes the test for unreasonableness a question of
policy: whether the utility of the propeller system outweighed the high
degree of risk.25 Presumably it did from the time of design until January,
1956, the advent of Pitch Lock. At least this seemed to be the attitude of
21 Prosser, Torts 152 (3d ed. 1964).
22 Supra note 9, at 72, 1 Av. Cas. at 699.
23 A reading of both opinions indicates this was assumed to be true. Libellants either
failed to show that a safer design was feasible at the time respondent designed its propeller
system or did not try to because they brought suit on the continuing duty theory.
24 Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., supra note 9, at 76, 1 Av. Cas. at 701; 1
Kreindler, Aviation Acddent Law § 7.02[1[dl (1963) which states, "To say that a
manufacturer can only be held to the state of the art existing at the time of its activity,
is simply another way of saying that a manufacturer should not be [adjudged] negli-
gent." See Northwestern Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., supra note 12, at 124 (ap-
plying Ohio law in a suit brought by airline), where the court refused to find the Martin
Company negligent as a matter of law when it knew of danger in its wing design but
contended that, according to the state of the art, nothing could have been done to al-
leviate the danger, metal fatigue.
25 Restatement (Second), Torts § 291 (1965).
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the district court when it implied that had respondent been expending a
reasonable amount of its resources and manpower on improvement, it would
have had a defense, 2 6 and the appellate court said nothing to negate the
implication.
After such a conclusion respondent could have been held liable for defec-
tive design only upon the theory that the industry should bear the burden of
distributing the risk as a cost of doing business or upon the theory of
implied warranty. But, these are theories of absolute liability and absolute
liability one shade removed rather than liability for negligence. Therefore,
in spite of the fact that a finding of defective design was essential for the
warning and continuing duty issues, defective design was not properly an
independent ground of negligence; the risk created by the design was not
unreasonable at the relevant time.
I1. LAILITY FOR FAmURE TO WARN LAV
It is generally said that a manufacturer or seller of chattels which to
his actual or constructive knowledge involve a danger to users has a duty
to give warning of the danger or the facts likely to make them so.2 7 This
duty exists with respect to products which the courts have characterized
as "defectively made"28 or "dangerous though not defectively made," 29 but,
if the danger is obvious (not the case in Noel), a warning is generally not
required. 0 In contrast to the duty to exercise proper care in designing a
product, dischargeable at the time of design, a duty to warn may sometimes
arise after the time of sale when the manufacturer acquires knowledge of
the danger.3' In all cases the duty is to warn of those dangers which
the manufacturer should reasonably foresee.3 2 When the warning can
accompany the product, the purpose is to apprise those persons using it of
dangers not reasonably to be anticipated in its use.33 But, where the warning
cannot accompany the product, the purpose is to permit the purchaser to
take precautions against injury to third persons by transmitting the warning
or by repairing or replacing the product.3 4 Thus, the legal adequacy of a
26 Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., supra note 3, at 572-73.
27 See Restatement (Second), Torts § 388 (1965); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 16 (1961).
28 Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
29 Tomao v. A. P. De Sanno & Son, Inc., 209 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1954). See Marker
v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957).
30 Annot., 76 A.,.R.2d 9, 28 & n.18 (1961) (citing cases).
31 Comstock v. General Motors Corp., supra note 28.
32 Dillard & Hart, "Products Liability: Directions for Use and Duty to Warn," 41 Va.
L. Rev. 145, 146, 156-60 (1955). See Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 16-21 (1961); Annot., 86
A.L.R. 947 (1933).
83 See McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712
(1953) (purpose of special poison labeling statute); Restatement (Second), Torts § 388,
comment n, at 310.
34 See Restatement (Second), Torts § 388 at 307-10. Burns v. Pennsylvania Rubber
& Supply Co., 117 Ohio App. 12, 189 N.E.2d 645 (1961).
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warning depends on whether the policy supporting the requirement is served.
In deciding whether a warning is required and whether a warning would
discharge the manufacturer of liability, the courts have looked at the
characteristics3 3 of the product and the likelihood that a warning was com-
municated to the user.3 6 When the characteristics creating the danger were
inherent 37 but the danger was avoidable by proper use of the product, the
courts have relieved the manufacturers who gave adequate warning from
liability. On the other hand, when a defect in the product38 created the
85 See, e.g., Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 910 (1958), in which the court said, "Nathan Prashker knew... that his craft
was a faster, aerodynamically 'cleaner' airplane ... [than his others.] A fast, 'dean' air-
plane is more difficult to fly, both on visual flight rules and on instruments... ." Id. at
605. The court also asserted that the duty to warn was discharged by warnings to avoid
instrument flight conditions. Id. at 607. In Comstock v. General Motors Corp., supra note
28, the court claimed, "A modem automobile equipped with brakes which fail without
notice is as dangerous as a loaded gun." Id. at 173, 99 N.W.2d at 632. General Motors
was held liable for not warning the owner. In Saporito v. Purex Corp., 40 Cal. 2d 608, 255
P.2d 7 (1953), the court found: "There was evidence that Purex is an unstable chemical
solution which decomposes gradually, forms a gas and, when bottled, creates gas pres-
sure." Id. at 610, 255 P.2d at 8. The plaintiff, who had not been warned, was injured
when the bottle exploded, and defendant was held liable. In Thomas v. Jerominek, 8
Misc. 2d 517, 170 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1957), the complaint charged that the right
rear door of the automobile was hinged at the rear side of the door rather than at the
front side to a door post in the middle of the auto. The court concluded that since plain-
tiff had complained of nothing that could be called a latent defect, the complaint would
be dismissed. And, in Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, 239 Mo. App. 355, 186 S.W.2d 217
(1945), the court concluded, "Persons of ordinary intelligence . . . know that openly
woven, fluffy and 'fuzzy wuzzy' materials will ignite and burn more readily than ordi-
nary cloth." Id. at 359, 186 S.W.2d at 220. Plaintiff's "fuzzy wuzzy" dress was ignited
by a cigarette she had been smoking, and defendant was held not liable for failure to
warn.
38 See, e.g., Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 Pac. 945 (1926), in which
the court held that a tractor manufacturer who fully explained the method of operation
to purchasers was not required to notify their servants because the "very appearance of
a complicated piece of machinery such as this is in itself a sufficient warning to one who
desires to use it that he should acquaint himself with its power and possibilities." Id. at
347-48, 246 Pac. at 947. In Tomao v. A. P. De Sanno & Co., supra note 29, the court said,
"its peculiar or special purpose was not at all evident on its face and was not otherwise
brought home to those who might have occasion to use it. Without indicating to third
persons [by information on the label] the special nature of the [grinding] wheel, we
think defendant has not brought itself within the 'special purpose' exception." Id. at 547.
And, in Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945), the court found
that the warning on the can of cleaning fluid was not prominent enough to communicate
the danger to the housewife.
37 "An article may be ... inherently dangerous where the danger lies in the nature
or character of the article... " 46 Am. Jur. Sales § 814, at 939 (1943). See Annot, 164
AL. 371, 377-80 (1946).
38 During the emergent period of products liability law such products were some-
times said to be "imminently dangerous." See Am. Jur. Sales § 815 (1943); Annot., 164
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danger and the danger could not be avoided by proper use of the product,
the courts have spoken of a duty to warn,3 9 but rarely, if ever, have they
found that a warning could relieve a manufacturer of liability.40
A.L.R. 375 (1946). This term has fallen into disuse because of confusion with "inherently
dangerous."
89 In Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1961), plaintiff was in-
jured by an explosion in the unventilated trunk of an English Ford. In regard to this case
Professor Dix W. Noel remarks:
The opinion speaks of a duty to warn, and perhaps the distributor would have
been protected by an adequate warning of the unsafe design; but it would seem
that the manufacturer of the car would be under a duty definitely to provide
the vents, if they were found by the jury to be needed for safe construction.
It is fantastic to suppose that even with a warning users of the car would check
the trunk for fumes before opening it with a lighted cigarette in hand or before
turning on the ignition.
Noel, supra note 18, at 824.
40 None of the cases cited in Annot., 76 AL..R.2d 9 (1961) and Annot., 86 AL..R. 947
(1963) have so found. In many cases a supplier of defective chattels or one who has
negligently supplied the wrong chattel has not been relieved by a warning to the person
supplied. Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925);
Frazier v. Ayres, 20 So. 2d 754 (La. Ct. App. 1945); Mitchell v. Lonergan, 285 Mass. 266,
189 N.E. 39 (1934) (driver of car acquired knowledge of defective brakes by his own
test); Ferraro v. Taylor, 197 Minn. 5, 265 N.W. 829 (1936) (also discovery instead of
warning); Stout v. Madden, 208 Ore. 294, 300 P.2d 461 (1956) (discovery, not warning,
but court said warning could not relieve of liability); Trusty v. Patterson, 299 Pa. 469,
149 Atl. 717 (1930) (discovery, not warning). See Restatement (Second), Torts § 389
(1965). Cf. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U.S. 159 (1909) (no warning); Clement
v. Crosby & Co., 148 Mich. 293, 111 N.W. 745 (1907) (no warning); 1 Kreindler, Avia-
tion Accident Law § 7.0213] [a] (1963).
The distinction between products safe, if properly used, and products defective for
the use intended can best be clarified by specific examples. For instance, tractors tend
to turn over backwards when improperly used. Thus, the courts have required that warn-
ing and information be given of such characteristic. But, since a full explanation of such
danger cannot be put on the machine, a complete explanation given in the manual which
accompanies the tractor will serve the purpose underlying the warning requirement and
shift liability to the purchaser for injury to third persons. Foster v. Ford Motor Co.,
supra note 36; Ford Motor Co. v. Wolber, 32 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S.
565 (1929). Accord, Holmes v. Ashford, [1950] 2 All E.R. 76 (Ct. App.). It is implied in
I Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law § 7.02[4] (1963), that this principle is applicable in
the aviation field since the author states that the manufacturer is liable for failure to give
information; therefore, he must be discharged if he does.
The case is different with cleaning fluids. Though carbon tetrachloride is safe for the
purpose intended, the fumes may cause death. Consequently, a warning and information
must be put on the container to call attention to the dangers and prescribe procedures
for the efficient use of the product and avoidance of the danger, James, "Products Lia-
bility," 34 Texas L. Rev. 44, 55 n.89 (1955), by the purchaser or third persons. But, when
full information is given, the policy underlying the requirement has been served. McClaren
v. G. S. Robins & Co., 349 Mo. 653, 162 S.W.2d 856 (1942).
If, however, the manufacturer makes a defective product, the question is really not
one of warning. An automobile placed on the market with defective brakes is dangerous
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Obviously, the propeller feathering mechanism which caused the injury
in Noel was defective. But, assuming that respondent's "state of the art
defense" made the design nonnegligent, no purpose would have been served
by a mere warning to LAV, for, presumably in the circumstances of this
case, the airline would have had the same defense as respondent.41 A warning
would have shifted a non-existent liability.
The fact is there were no feasible alternatives which LAV could have
used to avoid the risk. Respondent controlled about ninety per cent of the
propeller industry, and the opinions of both courts assume that LAV could not
have obtained an alternative device from another source.4 Another device
called the integral oil system had been used to some degree by the military4s
but had been rejected for commercial airlines as too expensive, too heavy, too
complicated and poorly located; it was not a workable solution.44
Under these circumstances the duty to warn cannot stand as an inde-
pendent ground of negligence in Noel. Because respondent 'had not done all
he could be reasonably asked to do, the duty to warn, if imposed at all,
must be a corollary of another duty. The risk created by respondent's product
was excusable up to January, 1956. As the case was decided, however,
respondent was under a continuing duty prior to that date to develop a safer
product. If a warning was properly required, it must have been a corollary
to respondent's duty to develop and make available an improvement for his
product. Under this analysis, if respondent had developed and made Pitch
not only to the purchaser or user but also to other automobile owners and pedestrians.
Comstock v. General Motors Corp., supra note 28, at 176, 99 N.W.2d at 634. In this
situation a warning might reach the owner and other users, but the policy underlying the
duty to warn cannot be fully served; it is impossible for the manufacturer to put a
warning within reach of all persons subjected to the risk. Consequently, the manufacturer
should be required to do something more, for the real test of liability is whether the
manufacturer has done all he reasonably could be asked to do to prevent the loss. See,
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); Comstock v.
General Motors Corp., supra note 28. Cf. Restatement (Second), Torts § 447 (1965).
If the product is defective, generally, he has not done all he can by just giving a
warning, at least where nothing can be reasonably done by the warned party about the
defect. Professor Noel, supra note 18, asserts:
It would seem that where a safety device can be easily attached and will
remedy a real danger, there should be a duty to take reasonable steps to supply
the safety device even to those to whom the product already has been sold. There
is no doubt that such a duty exists when it develops that the original design is
clearly defective.
Id. at 826.
41 Galer v. Wings Ltd., 47 Man. 281 (1938).
42 The courts did not discuss this point explicitly, but the district court's reference
to respondent's dominant position in the industry indicates it assumed there was no
other source. 219 F. Supp. at 572-73.
43 This system was used during or shortly after World War II on some military air-
craft, 219 F. Supp. at 570; 342 F.2d at 237, but it was not in use in 1956, the time of the
accident, Brief for Respondent, p. 34 n.27.
44 Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., supra note 7, at 237, supra note 3, at 570.
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Lock available to LAV prior to the accident, a warning and proffer of the
device would have been an efficient act. It would have been effective to
discharge respondent of liability; by giving LAV a feasible alternative to
the defective propeller system it was using, respondent would have done all
he reasonably could be asked to do. Therefore, the court's treatment of the
duty to warn as an independent ground of negligence should be regarded as
erroneous.
III. LIABILITY POR BREACH OF CONTINUING DuTY To IMPoV PRODUCT
As a general proposition of tort law, a continuing duty to develop and
make available safety devices for products previously sold gives most manu-
facturers good cause to shudder. Thus, respondent poses important questions
when he asks:
For instance, under the trial court's doctrine, is Ford required to
develop and make available power brakes for the remaining model
A's? Must every manufacturer stay in business to develop and make
available improvements for products previously sold? Is a manu-
facturer required to purchase patent rights from others to develop
and make available improvements on his own products already sold?
If a manufacturer is under a "continuing duty" to invent and
make available improvements, at what price must these be made
available? 45
Contrary to respondent's fears and trepidations, however, an analysis of
traditional bases for the imposition of affirmative duties and of limitations
implicit in the doctrine suggested by the court will show that the extension
of negligence principles accomplished by Noel was a justifiable and manage-
able one.
By traditional doctrine, when a man acts he has a duty to exercise due
care with regard to all persons who may foreseeably be injured thereby.46
For instance, a man driving on a public highway must not cross the line so
as to collide with another. But, generally, the individualistic philosophy of
the common law, which viewed a requirement of beneficent action as an
unwarranted limitation on personal freedom, has made the courts reluctant
to require positive action.47 Yet the law does require a person to take positive
action for the protection of others if he is the dominant party to certain special
relationships, such as carrier-passenger, employer-employee, invitor-invitee,
45 Brief for Respondent, p. 34 n.27.
46 2 Harper & James, Torts § 18.6, at 1044 (1956). Historically, "the primary con-
ception of a tortious act was an act done directly injurious to another's rights." Bohlen,
Studies in the Law of Torts 37 (1926). The actor owed a duty to such person "not to do
that which may cause a personal injury to that other, or may injure his property." (Em-
phasis added.) Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491, 497. For a similar present day
definition see Dempsey v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 75, 81 (W.D. Ark. 1959). For a
full definition of "negligence" see Seavey, Cogitations on Torts 25-26 (1954).




possibly parent-child and nurse-invalid, and parties who have induced reliance
by promising to perform an act.48 Likewise, if respondent, as a manufacturer
of a propeller system which created a high degree of risk, was properly
required to develop and make available improvements for its product, the
courts must have felt that respondent's status in society as a manufacturer
possessing special skill and knowledge put it in a special relationship with
LAV's passengers.
As a matter of legal history, affirmative duties have been imposed on the
dominant party in such relationships when he voluntarily entered upon the
course of conduct involved for the purpose of making a profit49 and when he
had the power to control the property or the relationship.50 The benefit
accruing and the dependency fostered by his actions have justified such
impositions. Although the listed elements are not found in every one of the
previously named relationships, each is present to some degree in Noel.
Respondent entered voluntarily into the business of manufacturing propeller
systems for profit and sold one to LAV with the expectation that it would
be used on passenger airliners, receiving an indirect monetary benefit from
the passengers without whom neither LAV nor respondent could have
engaged in business. Furthermore, by virtue of its status in the propeller
industry, a position attended by almost exclusive possession of superior
knowledge and skill in propeller system design, respondent enjoyed the type
of dominance and control over the beneficial relationship that has resulted
in the imposition of affirmative duties as aforementioned. Like a nurse's
patient or a carrier's passenger, LAV and its passengers were dependent upon
respondent for their safety.
Although the preceding discussion appears to place respondent within
48 See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 18.6, at 1044-49 (1956); Restatement (Second),
Torts § 323 (1965).
49 Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 46, at 42-48. Concerning the benefit principle, Bohien
asserts:
Such obligations arise only when assumed, but they are not the creatures
wholly of consent, they may be annexed to the performance of certain acts, the
conduct of certain businesses, the use of property in certain ways; the performance
of these acts, the entering into such business, and the use of the property is wholly
voluntary, but if done, the duties follow as a matter resting wholly on the
policy of law, that policy which protects the right of citizens from positive
injury. Such duties therefore only arise when they are necessary to protect
others from the consequences of acts, businesses, or uses of property beneficial
to those who do them, engage in them, and use it ....
Id. at 62-63. (Emphasis added.) McNiece & Thornton, "Affirmative Duties in Tort," 58
Yale L.J. 1272, 1282 (1949), suggest that the benefit principle is the "binding thread" of
those relationships which impose a duty of care. However, 2 Harper & James, Torts
§ 18.6, at 1049 n.22 (1956), suggests that this principle may be too narrow to cover all
the relationships.
Go See De Vito v. United Air Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951) ; 1 Xreindler,
Aviation Accident Law § 7.02[3][b] (1963). The element of control also exists in the
parent-child and nurse-invalid relationships.
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the broad policies justifying the imposition of affirmative duties, Noel repre-
sents an application of these policies without precedent in the decisions but
definitely within their trend. Historically, the imposition of affirmative duties
progressed from owners of business property5' to suppliers of chattels.
5 2
But difficulties arose earlier when attempts were made to hold contractors and
manufacturers liable to persons with whom they had not directly dealt. The
holding in Winterbottom v. Wright,53 that no duty of care was owed to
persons not in privity with the contractor, was a limitation resulting from a
misconception of the relationship between the duty imposed by law and the
benefit accruing to the contractor. Protection was given only to the party
conferring the benefit, whereas previously the benefit required did not have
to come from the party protected. The same limitation was applied to manu-
facturer's liability.54
This restriction, however, gradually eroded away. In imposing liability
to third persons, the courts at first relied on a theory of deception, limiting
liability to situations where the manufacturer knew, or should have known,
of a defect which the intervening retailer did not discover.55 Subsequently
protection was extended to situations where the product was "inherently" or
"imminently" dangerous. 56 Then in Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co.57 a
duty to prevent injury to persons not in privity, analogous to that imposed
on suppliers of chattels, was imposed on manufacturers.58 And, finally, in
Noel the court took a further step.
A comparison of the affirmative duties imposed by Mac Pherson and
Noel illustrates the precise extension of traditional negligence principles
accomplished. From Mac Pherson a duty to inspect arises before sale, and
its effective discharge requires that appropriate action be taken before sale.
From Noel a duty to improve arises at the time the manufacturer learns of
51 In Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (1867), the upper court held that a
gasfitter who went to a sugar refinery for the purpose of inspecting a gas regulator was
entitled to expect that the occupier "shall . . . use reasonable care to prevent damage
from unusual danger which he knows or ought to know... ." Id. at 313. (Emphasis
added.)
52 In Elliott v. Hall, 15 Q.B.D. 315 (1885), a colliery owner was held liable to third
persons for failure to discover by inspection the defective conditions of trucks (coal cars)
used in his business.
53 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842).
54 2 Harper & James, Torts § 18.5, at 1040-41 (1956).
55 Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Afinn. 331, 51 N.V. 1103 (1892). Cf. Levi v.
Langridge, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Exch. 1837), aff'd, 1 H. & H. 325 (1838).
56 2 Harper & James, Torts § 18.5, at 1040-42 (1956).
7 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
58 McNiece & Thornton, supra note 49, at 1286, claim:
The whole aim of the manufacturer or supplier is to obtain economic benefit
through the operation of the chain reaction represented by the manufacturer,
wholesaler, retailer, and consumer. Since benefit accrues to the manufacturer or
supplier through this chain, it is not an illogical corollary to require affirma-
tive action, such as inspection, in order to safeguard the members of the chain
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or is chargeable with knowledge of the risk created. Such knowledge may
be acquired before or after sale of a particular product unit, but the action
necessary to discharge the duty must take place, in part at least, after the
sale. In spite of when the duty arises, it continues until the manufacturer
has developed and made available the necessary improvements (as respon-
dent failed to do). Thus, Noel is unique in that the duty of a manufacturer
to continue developing his product for the protection of persons making use
of those units already sold was for the first time articulated.5 9
Noel results in a rather complicated concept of negligence, the operation
of which may be described in general terms as follows: assuming the manu-
facturer knows or should know of the danger created, but the utility of his
product outweighs the risk, he may design and sell the product and be
excused from liability in recognition of the limitations of human knowledge
and skill if he exercises care up to those limits. Although temporarily excused,
he is nonetheless under a duty to use due care and a reasonable amount of
his resources in developing a safety device which will reduce the risk. Once
he has succeeded, he must make the device available to owners of units pre-
viously sold or be liable for injuries occurring at or after the time he should
have done so. He is no longer excused from liability because the burden of
improving the product no longer outweighs the probability and gravity of
injury. The result is that the manufacturer escapes liability for a period,
and society or the individual bears any loss occurring, but only for so long
as the manufacturer is excusably limited in knowledge and skill.
As previously stated, this principle is not unmanageable; it has certain
built in limitations. It would not be applicable in situations where a product
was negligently designed or manufactured or where a warning effective to
relieve the manufacturer of liability could be given, for the existing princi-
ples of manufacturer's liability adequately cover such cases.60 Nor would
it exist where the probability and gravity of injury if it occurred were
slight.61 Rather the duty to improve a product should exist only where in
spite of the risk created (unreasonable but for the limitations of knowledge
and skill) society needs the product and the manufacturer's status as a
skilled and knowledgeable member of the particular industry makes society
in general and purchasers and users in particular dependent on him to dis-
charge the responsibility of developing a safer product. These factors
coalesced to bring liability upon respondent in Noel, but it is highly unlikely
that they require Ford to provide power brakes for the extant Model A's.
CONCLUSION
In Noel the respective courts were presented with a problem somewhat
unique, but one bound to become less so in this age of technological advance.
Presumably, respondent's propeller system measured up to the state of the
59 See Restatement (Second), Torts § 321 (1965), which requires an affirmative act
of warning where a warning will be effective, but does not go as far as Noel.
60 Ibid.
61 See Pontifex v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 226 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1955).
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art at the time of design. Nothing to the contrary was shown. Assuming then
that the utility of the product outweighed the risk created, liability was
improperly based on principles of negligent design. The result would be
the same if Noel were treated as a negligent sale case because no feasible
*safety device was known or available at either the time of design or sale.
The fact remains, however, that respondent knew of the dangers involved
but did not convey that information to LAV. Under some such circumstances
the law requires a warning. But, in Noel a warning to LAV would have
accomplished nothing as long as LAV could not obtain a safety device from
other sources; the policy of requiring a warning to prevent an avoidable risk
could not have been served. Consequently, respondent was obligated to take
positive action to reduce the risk by improvement of its product. In view of
the voluntary nature of the relationship between respondent and LAV's
passengers, the profit such relationship was designed to give respondent and
the control it had over the product market, the duty imposed in Noel does
not seem to be an unjust burden.
This analysis places no particular emphasis on the continuing relation-
ship between respondent and LAV which the court of appeals gave as the
basis of its decision. Presumably, if this relationship, which might or might
not exist in any particular case, were to be taken as the basis of liability,
the rationale would have to be that of undertaking, a theory which would be
much more difficult to maintain and which would not achieve the desired
protection in cases where there was no continuing relationship. If the court
had granted a rehearing as Judge Biggs suggested should have been done,62
a more adequate rationale might have been articulated. However, in spite of
this deficiency, Noel stands as an example of the increasing demands being
placed on manufacturers to exhibit a social consciousness not inspired by
the profit motive.
62 Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 244 (1965) (dissent).
